

Political Economy of Insurgency in Nigeria: An Analysis of Boko Haram Sects in the Northeast

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Abstract

This study explored the political economy of Boko Haram insurgency in the North-east of Nigeria. The central argument of this study is that, the upsurge Boko Haram Insurgency has posed serious threats to economy and insecurities to human existence in Nigeria. Using both primary and secondary data collection method the study identify among other things that Boko Haram insurgency have claimed thousands of lives and displaced inestimable properties, rendering the northeast region as the most dangerous zone in Nigeria today. That such threat affects the nation's stability and development prospects. Using frustration aggression theory, the study identified various factors that precipitated the growth and development of Boko Haram insurgency in the northern Nigeria. These include: inequality and social injustices, ethnicity problem, sycophancy, favouritism and marginalization, bad governance and corruption, religious extremism, unemployment, poverty and social frustration. The study concludes that, the threats incurred by Boko Haram sects on Nigerian state have profound security and economic implications; Boko Haram insurgents today threaten the viability of Nigerian state thereby brings about economic crises, political instability, growth and development.

Keywords: Insurgency, Boko Haram, Political Economy and Nigerian State

1.1 Introduction

Nigerian state has become war against humanity and survival of the fittest could be a better word to use. Base on operational indices of global conflict and failed state index, Nigeria is a country in a state of deep and ubiquitous crisis and political malaise. This development has been aggravated by insurgency in Niger Delta and Boko Haram in the northeast region (Bassey and Ubi, 2015).

The Boko Haram insurgencies in the Northeast of Nigeria have threatened the very existence of the living beings, ranging from political, economic and cultural aspect. The sect has create a kind of Hobbesian state where life is solitary, nasty, brutish and short because of nihilism and violence of men. The country's economy has been sunk into the river of distress which had recently called for disintegration of indissoluble entity of Nigerian state. Boko Haram insurgency since 2009 has created a state of palpable fear in Nigeria, while the helpless posture of the government is worrisome and intimidated (Olameji and Olusegun, 2012; Titus, 2016).

Boko Haram insurgency has disastrous impacts on Nigeria's economy. Boko Haram has caused most Nigerians injury and pains. It has brought to Nigerians hunger and unleashed untold hardship on the Nigerian citizens, the economy is bleeding. The insurgents unchecked creates uncertainty, reduces confidence and increase risk perception and risk premium leading to low rates of investment and low economic growth (Titus, 2016). Economies which fail to combat terrorism and ensure the safety of trade and people movement could expect to incur significant cost in terms of lost of investment and trade opportunities; threat of Boko Haram reduces trade flows. It activities continued to deepening national economic crisis (Badejogbin, 2013).

The contradictions caused by Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria manifested in its political economy ranging from abject poverty, poor quality education, lack of jobs among others, breeds the atmosphere of frustration expectations and these predicament find it expression in various shades of anti-social behaviours such as kidnapping, drug abuse and robbery among others. The damages it has done to Nigerian political economy are astronomical (Ogege, 2013).

Nigeria is the most populated country in Africa and is blessed with a lot of mineral resources. But unfortunately its political economy is facing with contradictions ranging from lack of good governance, exploitation and stagnation, chaos and state of anarchy.

To be sure, the post-colonial political economy of Nigerian state has been marked by missed opportunities; truncated development and frustration hope (Izah, 2014). The failures of governance manifested in poor socio-economic performance, causing suffering and unfulfilled expectations as well as

facilitate insurgency, conflict and political instability.

Today, Nigeria has witnessed unprecedented incidences of economic doldrums, societal dislocations and political upheavals. Boko Haram have lead to closure of many industries resulting in loss of employment, eradication of middle class and erosion in purchasing power of an average worker (Izah, 2014; Shambahavi and Samuel, 2014 cited in Titus, 2016). Indeed, the civil society is becoming high restive and confrontational to the Nigerian state expressing their discontent by carrying arms and explosives to destroyed lives and properties due to the mode of social production and productive forces. Therefore it is the aim of this paper explores the impacts of Boko Haram Insurgency on Nigeria's political economy.

1.2 Conceptual Analysis

Insurgency: Broadly speaking insurgency is that armed movement or struggle seeking to overthrow an existing government using a variety of violent and non-violent tactics that include drawing support and sympathy from acquiescent population in weak state fractured along ethnic and sectarian cleavages (Mackinlay, 2002; Carrol, 2012). The consequence is that, Insurgent step into the vacuum created by the legitimacy deficits to offer radical alternative. Insurgency on the basis of motivation, capability and *modus operandi* could be driven by greed and grievances. To these scholars, insurgency is rooted from local grievances and political failings.

In their perspectives, Fearon and Laitin (2001) described insurgency as a technology of military conflict characterized by small, lightly armed bandits practicing guerrilla warfare from rural base areas. To them, the condition that favoured insurgencies is because of independent of cultural differences between groups and group grievances, for example, rough terrain, as the case of Northeast of Nigeria (poor road networks- thick forest), and insurgents most time get their support from foreign government as transnational politics.

According to Gompert and Gordon (2008) insurgencies traditionally, seeks to overthrow an existing order (like Nigerian constitution) with one that is commensurate with their political, economic and ideological goals. Insurgency is "an organized rebellion aimed at overthrowing a constituted government through subversion and armed conflict" (Abolurin, 2011). Insurgency is also known as rebellion, revolution, revolt, uprising, and mutiny. Kilullen (2006) opined that, insurgency is a struggle to control a contested political space between a state and non-state challenges. Insurgency is any act of violence on behalf of the minorities, either spontaneous or planned, which is construed as politically motivated (Fording, 2001).

In another development, insurgency connotes an internal uprising often outside the confines of State laws and it is often characterized by social, economic and political goals as well as guerrilla tactics (Kilullen, 2006). Bard O'Neil (1990) conceptualized insurgency as; "a struggle between a non-ruling group and the ruling authorities in which the non-ruling consciously uses political resource (e.g. protest, propaganda, demonstrations and violence to destroy) reformulate or sustain the basis of legitimacy of one or more aspect of polices".

Paraphrasing Clausewitz, "insurgency is the pursuit of the policy, inside a country, by every means". It is not like an ordinary war- a continuation of the policy by other means because an insurgency can stay long before, the insurgent resort to the use of force. Insurgency is a protracted struggle conducted methodically, step by steps, in order to attain specific intermediate objectives leading finally to the overthrow the existing order (as the case of China 1927-49; Greece 1945-50; Indonesia 1945-54; Malaya, 1948-60; Algeria 1954-62; Tunisia 1952-56; Cyprus 1955- 59) among others (Galula, 1964).

More importantly, insurgency is a political strategy adopted by the militia groups to attain their goals which could not be possible through conventional means. Insurgency takes a form of guerrilla warfare, terrorism, assassination and sabotage, and other types of asymmetric violence. However, the factors that motivated insurgents from history of Maoist people's war include; anger, deprivation, frustration (economic), and repression (military) as the case of Northeast (Metz and Millen, 2004 emphasis added).

On the nature of insurgency, insurgents often pursue some common objectives targeted at undermining the legitimacy and policies of government while increasing their own ties with the communities they lived in. insurgencies seek to accomplish these; pressures government to provide the communities with security and public service, including; utilities, education, infrastructures and social justice. And the consequence is, when a government who has continually failed to provide the population with basic infrastructure has little chances of convincing and winning the minds of the insurgents (Thompson, 1966).

Typologies of Insurgency

Insurgencies have been categorized in different ways as by; goal, tactics, size, religion, duration, international significance and the character of the regime challenged (Gompert and Gordon, 2008). In some conflicts, multiple insurgent groups may operate simultaneously, either competing with one another or setting aside the fact that they may have differing views on post- conflict governance to form temporary alliance against the government. John Mackinlay developed his insurgent typologies into lumpen, clan, popular and global (Mackinlay, 2002).

Drawing from the types of insurgencies from their specific goals, US Government noted the following five typologies:

- *Revolutionary* insurgencies seek to replace the existing political order with an entirely different system, often entailing transformation of the economic and social structures.
- *Reformist* insurgencies do not aim to change the existing political order but, instead, seek to compel the government to alter its policies or undertake political, economic, or social reforms.
- *Separatist* insurgencies seek independence for a specific region. In some cases, the region in question spans existing national boundaries.
- *Resistance* insurgencies seek to compel an occupying power to withdraw from a given territory.
- *Commercialist* insurgencies are motivated by the acquisition of wealth or material resources; political power is simply a tool for seizing and controlling access to the wealth (Guide to the Analysis of Insurgency, 2012).

Boko Haram: The term Boko Haram is a derivation of Hausa word-Boko meaning- Animist western or otherwise non-Islamic education, while Haram is a word with Arabic origin that figuratively means- sin but literally, forbidden. In other words, Boko Haram means -western education is forbidden or is a sin. Boko Haram is very controversial Nigeria militant Islamic group that seeks for the imposition of sharia law in the entire northern states of Nigeria. The name officially of the group is jama'atu Alis-sunna Lidda'awthiwal jihad, which in Arabic translated to people committed to the propagation of the teaching of prophet and jihad literally therefore, the group means- Association of sunnis for the propagation of Islam and for Holy war.

Political Economy: Defined as the interconnectedness of political and economic factors in understanding development, dynamics in social formation. It aims at knowing what is happening to people's incomes, well-being and livelihood.

1.3 Methodology

This paper used both primary and secondary method of collection of data. The primary data was gathered from key informants' interviews conducted by the researchers. 5 respondents were interviewed through mobile phone calls who are residents of some states in the northeast. Data analysis is qualitative in nature, which entails the classification of things, persons and events as well as the properties which characterizes them. This study, however posits that in a typical qualitative research, the researcher all through the data analysis process, code their data by using as many categories as possible. As such, data analysis in this paper was organized categorically and chronologically. It was reviewed and coded. The aim was to find out the interplay of interests driving the debate on political economy of insurgence and this approach provides a useful way of understanding the phenomenon. others source of data was obtained through literature survey of books, reports of dailies and periodicals, government publications, conference papers and seminar reports among other. Descriptive analysis was employed to analyze the data gathered which was presented in a narrative ways.

1.4 Theoretical Framework

The frustration of the inhabitants in Northeast result from the failure of Nigerian State to satisfy their socio-economic needs, which led them into insurgency. Specifically, the frustration is caused by the pervasive poverty and underdevelopment.

However, scholars, analysts and practitioners have propounded various theories/ perspectives to explain the nature of insurgencies in Nigeria. Such perspectives include; War Economies and Neo-patrimonialism, Deprivation theory, cultural theories among several others. But for the purpose of this paper, "Frustration-Aggression Theory" is adopted as framework of analysis. Frustration- Aggression Theory has its roots in the work of Dollard *et al* (1939). The theory assumed that, human frustration may lead to aggressive behaviour. That, frustration ultimately lead to aggression and aggression always implies that frustration has occurred at some previous time. That, individuals become aggressive where there are obstacles (perceive and real) to their success in life (Bekwizt, 1963; Marie, 2004). In his hypotheses, Ted Gurr (1967) posited that, "the occurrence of aggressive behaviour always presupposes the existence of frustration and contrariwise that the existence of frustration leads to some form of aggression". That frustration result from; (a) the potential for collective violence is a function of the extent and intensity of share discontent among members of society and; (b) potential violence is function of the degree to which such share discontents are blamed on the political system and its agents, thus discontent arising from the perception is the basic instigating condition for participants in collective violence. To these scholars, all humans have basic needs (shelter, clothing and food), which they seek to fulfill, and that any blockade to fulfill these needs by individuals or group elicit violent responses. When people recognize the discrepancy between their initial social goals and present level of attainment, that is when achievement falls below set goals, they experience a sense of collective frustration (Fawole, 1994 in Akpomovie and Obukohwo, 2010). This means when people perceive that any future attainment of their social goals will be hampered not by their inabilities but by the political system. Their collective frustration may then find expression in aggressive behaviour directed at the political system and its

agents, which are perceived to be the source of their violent agitations.

However, the frustration- aggression theory is perfect to explain why the insurgents in northeast against Nigerian State and its immediate neighbours, and unleashed unprecedented mayhem and violence in the history of ethno-religious crisis in Nigeria. The Nigerian State leaving the region with impoverished, wallowing poverty and poor infrastructural development the insurgents to involved in the acts terror through suicide bombings, kidnapping, hostage-taking, robbery, raping and drug trafficking among others. They have become frustrated since the political system and its allies are not doing enough to breathe life into the people the region. It is an indisputable fact of history that, cultures of oppression, repression and the denial of fundamental rights and basic needs of life, generates culture of resistance- violent aggression (John, 2006 in Kuku, 2012).

Grievance embedded in socio-economic, cultural and political failure of Nigerian State namely; repressive acts characterized with brutality, corruption and mismanagement of State resources, non-participatory government and political exclusion, economic dislocation, ethnic polarization, marginalization, and other forms of inequality in the region.

However, critics of the “frustration-aggression theory” argued that, youths frustration is not resulted from youth’s negative culture (aggression, desperate and violent) alone but inability of institutions of the state and society to mediate and create alternative social safety networks to address the problem of armed insurgencies generated by perverse manifestation of state decay. The critics posited that, the underdevelopment of northeast is not result from frustration but consequences of deliberate policies and lack of political will by every successive politics. It is important to note also that, the existence of frustration does not always lead to aggression; given that frustration way has other consequences other than aggression. Argues that, what lead to insurgence in northeast is not frustration but competition between the West (capitalist) and emergent powers of the East in the struggle for energy resources and spheres of influences in global political economy and governance. That, most people do not take to violence even when they know that they are marginalized. Several factors abound why some aggrieved people find it difficult to take aggression. These include socio-economic status, Political leadership, military capability, psychological correlates (Caderman, Wimmer and Min, 2010 cited Tonwe and Aghedo, 2013). Collier (2000) in his “counter-thesis of the theory” argued that greed rather than grievances is more plausible in making sense of rebellion especially in naturally endowed context. Those resources conflicts are caused by the greed of rebel actors to capture wealth extra-legally (Collier and World Bank in Tonwe and Aghedo, 2013). In economic parlance, this study posit that, the set of variables representing insurgents opportunity akin to “loot-seeking” as the main reason for insurgency not grievance on ethnic divide, political inclusion and repression among other social maladies. Insurgence against the State borrowing from words of Collier (2000) stem from “greed” of the insurgents, that is Financing, recruitment (opportunity to induce fighting power made possible by high population of unemployed youths), and geography (location favourable to militia groups, terrain).

1.5 An Overview of Boko Haram Sect in Nigeria

Boko Haram is not official name of the group. The official name of the sect is Jama’atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda-awati wal-Jihad. The translation of this in Arabic means “people committed to the propagation of the prophet’s teachings and jihad.

According to the local Hausa language simply translates to “western education is forbidden or a sin” (Diego Cordano, 2014). The residents gave the group this name because of it strong aversion to western education, which it viewed as corrupting Muslims. The term “Boko Haram” is a derivation of the Hausa word Boko, which means “Animist”, western or otherwise non-Islamic education while “Haram” is word with Arabic origin that figuratively means sin but literally “forbidden” (Adibe, 2013). Boko Haram’s story begins with a preacher named Mohammed Yusuf born in 1927. At about 18 years, he moved to Kano, in what is today Northern Nigeria, and began a career as a preacher (Dauda, 2014, cited in Titus, 2016). His sermons were extreme and often bizarre. He was against western culture and it popularity in Nigeria so violently that he became known as “maitatsine”, meaning “the one who damns”. He declared that reading any book other than the Koran was sinful and a sign of paganism.

At first, maitatsine was ignored by Nigeria’s political leader, but as his sermon became increasingly anti-government in the late 1970s, the government cracked down. The crackdown culminated in an uprising in 1980s, where maitatsine followers in Kano began rioting against the government. Since then the spread followers lead to the formation of several ethnic group uprising in Nigeria (Shehu, 2012). The growth in support for shari’a and for abandoning the secular aims of the drafters of settlement of 1960 has transformed Northern Nigeria. Nigeria was always a divided country played by weak governance and ethnic two different countries entirely.

More evidently, disillusioned by the corruption and unjust governance that permeated the region, in 2002, the group sought to go underground by moving to a village in Yobe State called Kanama, also in

Northeast Nigeria, declaring that “it was embarking on a hijra (a withdrawal along the lines of the Prophet Mohammad’s withdrawal from Mecca to Medina)” to establish a way of life “under ‘true’ Islamic law, with the aim of making a more perfect society away from the corrupt establishment” and eventually forming a northern state based on the strict application of Shari’a law. Their withdrawal followed the law reform process in the north, which led to the introduction of a Shari’a-based criminal justice system that failed to meet the group’s expectations. The law reform process began subsequent to the end of military rule in 1998, when Zamfara State, followed by eleven other northern Nigerian states with predominantly Muslim populations, introduced criminal justice systems based on Shari’a law.

However, the governments in these states did not allow the full application of Shari’a law, including the harsh penalties for certain crimes mandated under a strict reading of Shari’a law, including death by stoning. This, coupled with the fact that the introduction of Shari’a criminal law was seen as having done little to change the corruption and mismanagement in the states, led to broad disillusionment. Therefore, Yusuf and his followers set out to create a parallel state within the state based on “true” Islamic law. Various sources indicate that Boko Haram turned violent following a 2009 incident that resulted in the death of the organization’s leader. Although since its founding in 2002 the group had engaged in small scale conflict with government authorities and its agents (including burning government buildings and killing police officers in Kanama, Geidam, Babangida, Damaturu, Bama and Gwoza), the vicious destruction of lives and properties of the sect cut across all the state in the Northeast Nigeria. Its actions were a far cry from the levels of violence that the group is infamous for today (Walker Andrew, 2012; Oriyommi Raifu, 2011). It is in this context with religious favour growing in the Muslim North and manifesting itself in violent uprising like maitatsine’s that Boko Haram was born.

Since 2009 Boko Haram has become a metaphor for insecurity in Nigeria after the government launched a clampdown on the group, which resulted in some 800 deaths, mostly of the sect members. Mohammed Yusuf, the group’s leader, was killed in that attack while in police custody. In what was apparently retaliation for the extra judicial killing of its leader, the group carried out its first terrorist attack in Borno in January 2010, at Dala Alemderi Ward in Maiduguri metropolis, Borno State, which resulted in the deaths of four people. Since then the sect has intensified its terrorist activities.

On June 16, 2011, for instance, it bombed the Police Force headquarters in Abuja, Nigeria’s capital, in what was thought to be the first case of using a suicide bomber to carry out a terrorist activity in Nigeria. On August 26, 2011, another suicide bomber blew up the UN headquarters in Abuja, leaving at least 21 people dead and dozens more injured. On January 20, 2012 it attacked Kano, leaving more than 185 people dead. In fact, a day hardly passes these days without news of attacks by the sect (Adibe, 2013; Titus, 2016).

Again, In December 2003, following a community dispute regarding fishing rights in a local pond, the group got into a conflict with the police. Group members overpowered a squad of officers and took their weapons. This confrontation led to a siege of its mosque by the army that lasted into the New Year. The siege ended in a shootout in which most of the group’s seventy members were killed, including Mohammed Ali (Sani, 2011).

The group had gained press attention in Nigeria, and interest from the U.S. Embassy, because of the catchy name locals had given it; the Nigerian Taliban. It also caught the attention of the Nigerian media because many of the group’s members were the sons of wealthy and influential people in Nigeria’s northern establishment.

In a 2004 U.S. State Department cable, revealed by Wikileaks, the U.S. embassy in Abuja concluded the group did not present an international threat and likely had no links to international jihadist organizations. The few survivors of the “Nigerian Taliban” returned to Maiduguri, where they settled back with others from the youth group that had originated at the Ndimi mosque. The leader of this Maiduguri group, Mohammed Yusuf, then embarked on the process of establishing the group’s own mosque in Maiduguri. This new mosque, named the IbnTaimiyyah Masjid, was built on land to the north of the center of town, near the railway station, owned by Yusuf’s father-in-law, Baba Fugu Mohammed. The group was apparently left alone by the authorities, and it expanded into other states, including Bauchi, Yobe, and Niger state. The group’s neighbors in Maiduguri dubbed the group Boko Haram, which roughly translates as “Western education is forbidden” in Hausa.

Observers say the group constructed a “state within a state,” with a cabinet, its own religious police, and a large farm. It attracted more and more people under its roof by offering welfare handouts, food, and shelter. Many of the people the group attracted were refugees from the wars over the border in Chad and jobless Nigerian youths. The source of the group’s money at this stage of its existence is not clear. Members of the Borno religious establishment say that Yusuf received funds from Salafist contacts in Saudi Arabia following two hajj trips that Yusuf made during this time. Another possible source of funding during this period was donations from wealthy northern Nigerians.

In 2006, a wealthy northern businessman was arrested by the State Security Services after a group

of children alleged that they had been sent by the group to an al-Qaeda training camp in Mauritania. The businessman says his donations to the group were an innocent attempt to contribute *zakat*, an obligation of wealthy Muslims to give charitably. On the eve of the 2007 presidential elections, Sheikh Ja'afar Mahmoud Adam, a prominent, popular cleric and regular preacher at the Ndimi mosque in Maiduguri, was assassinated as he was praying at the mosque he administered in Kano. The killing was a mystery for some time, but it is now acknowledged that it was carried out on the orders of Mohammed Yusuf. Sheikh Ja'afar had begun to criticize the group for its hard-line ideology, predicting a clash with the state. The killing is now seen by some as a key point in the development of Boko Haram, because there was no longer the possibility of turning Yusuf and his followers back to the mainstream of the northern Islamic establishment. Much bloodier events soon followed.

In July 2009 the group came into conflict with the authorities in a strikingly similar way to the events of six years before. Traveling en masse to the funeral of a fellow member, the group was stopped by police traffic officers, who were enforcing a tightened restriction on motorcycle helmets, and an argument ensued. The circumstances are unclear, but a member of the group is reported to have fired on the police, injuring several officers. The group then attacked police stations in Bauchi and Yobe, killing scores of police officers. Yusuf released several video sermons in which he explicitly threatened the state and the police with violence. They were circulated on DVD and gained a widespread audience. These events led the Bauchi government to crack down on the group, arresting more than seven hundred members.

In Maiduguri, the police surrounded the group's mosque, but members of the sect managed to break out and for three days they had the run of the town. They roamed the city acting independently, fighting police when they came across them and killing Muslim and Christian civilians indiscriminately. The police eventually regained control of Maiduguri, and then embarked on a bloody purge of the group's members and anyone they suspected of being a Boko Haram supporter or sympathizer. Dozens of people were rounded up and executed without trial, including Yusuf's father-in-law. Mohammed Yusuf was arrested by the army and handed over to the police, who killed him within hours. Police officials denied that he had been executed, saying he had been shot while trying to escape. Videos clearly showing the execution of young boys and other alleged Boko Haram members by the police, including BujiFoi, a former commissioner for religious affairs in the state government, have been posted on YouTube. Those members of the group who were not killed or arrested fled, some say out of Nigeria. They entered another incarnation, that of famous Islamists on the run.

After these events, the police and the army began to take information from traditional rulers and imams in Maiduguri about people suspected to be members or sympathizers of Boko Haram. If these people had fled, their property was confiscated and parceled out to the traditional leaders to keep or give to their supporters. An unknown number of people were denounced at this time and later disappeared, presumed executed by the police. A local journalist in Maiduguri believes the number of people who have disappeared in this way could be more than one hundred. The police deny such accusations. Little is known about where the members of Boko Haram who fled Maiduguri went during this 2009–2014 period. But the group's uprising undoubtedly brought its members to the attention of global jihadist movements and rebel groups based around the Sahel. Nigeria-based security sources told Reuters in January 2012 that they had tracked "several dozen" Nigerians to insurgent training camps in Algeria during this time. Sources reveal that this information was based on reports from human intelligence assets in such camps. The UN Security Council says that Boko Haram members received training in a Tuareg rebel camp in Mali. The foreign minister of Niger told reporters that Nigerians have been trained in rebel camps "across the Sahel region." It is believed that the group's since 2009 till date have caused a lot of problems in Nigeria. Indeed, since 2009 till date the sect have recorded a lot of atrocities in Nigeria (Wikipedia, origin of Boko Haram in Nigeria, 2014).

Structurally, Boko Haram is organized in a hierarchical structure with one overall leader. The founder, Mohammed Yusuf, was killed in 2009 while in police custody. Boko Haram is described as a diffuse group with a disjointed structure. Beyond its core committed members who participate directly in violent activities, the group is said to enjoy wide-ranging support among a large number of sympathizers in the northeast, where the group is the most active, including some politicians in the region (Titus, 2016).

In addition, there appears to be an increasing fragmentation in the structure of the group. The group has morphed into a collection of thirty autonomous cells governed by a thirty-member "Shura Council," with each Council member in charge of a cell. The cells are said to be responsible for different tasks and geographic locations. While decisions are made by the Council, whose members keep in touch only via mobile phones, the leader of the organization is said to have the power to make unilateral decisions. In addition, disagreements over a number of issues, including tactics and the civilian death toll, are said to have led to the creation of splinter groups. A good example of this is a group created in early 2012 known as "Ansaru," whose full name is Jamā'atu Anṣāru'l-Muslimīna fī Bilādī's-Sūdān (Vanguard of Muslims in Black Africa). Ansaru, highly critical of Boko Haram for inflicting casualties on Muslims, is reportedly less

interested in attacking civilian Nigerians than on attacking Nigerian government institutions, their agents, and international targets. However, the idea that Boko Haram is prone to splintering is disputed by some who argue that the group's decentralized, autonomous cell structure nullifies fissiparous tendencies. The level of coordination of operations and sharing of resources between Boko Haram and Ansaru appears to support this claim (Walker Andrew, 2012; OriyommiRaifu, 2011).

Since 2010, AbubakarShekau has led Boko Haram, 20 working primarily through intermediaries. Individual cell commanders have a great deal of autonomy in day-to-day operations. The exact strength is unknown although estimates range significantly. In the 2013 United States Department of State Country Reports on Terrorism, Boko Haram is listed as having anywhere from several hundred to a few thousand members (START Background Report, 2014).

Boko Haram Ideology and Goals

Boko Haram ideologically opposed to any rule of other than its interpretation of sharia. Boko Haram is a violent Sunni jihadist group founded by cleric Mohammed Yusuf, who was previously a leader within a Salafist group in the 1990s, and was inspired by 14th century fundamentalist scholar IbnTaymiyyah. As Boko Haram's alliances with al-Qa'ida-linked groups, such as al-Qa'ida in the Land of Islamic Maghreb (AQLIM), have strengthened, its interpretation of violent jihad has changed, increasing the scope of its targets and areas of activity beyond the borders of Nigeria. Its goals is that, Boko Haram wishes to expel the political community of northern Nigeria which they believe has been seized by corrupt and false Muslims and to establish a fundamentalist interpretation of Sharia (Islamic law) across all of Nigeria. The group also advocates against Western influence in Africa and has allied with several militant organizations to fight government forces in Mali and Nigeria. As evidenced by the increasing number of attacks against educational targets, Boko Haram also seeks to rid Nigeria of any Western education, including schools for girls (Walker Andrew, 2012; OriyommiRaifu, 2011). In terms of strategies, the Boko Haram used several ways to carry out their vicious acts such as Arson, mass killing by gunfire, jail break, recruitment of combatant, use of impoverished explosives (IED), kidnapping, media propaganda and advocacy, suicide bombings among others (Okoliet *al*, 2014).

Mode of Operation of Boko Haram

Boko Haram *modus operandi* includes Arson, mass killing by gunfire, jail break, recruitment of combatant, use of impoverished explosives, kidnapping, media propaganda and advocacy (Okoli, *et al*, 2014). Other techniques are the use of motorcycles for drive-by- shootings, early morning raid of villages and the killing of unarmed citizens found there; car bombs, suicide bombings, targeting churches, police stations, military establishment and personnels and issuance of ultimatum as a means of destabilizing social cohesion (The Guardian, 8 January, 2014).

Funding of Boko Haram

For more than 10 years of existence of the radical Islamist movement, BokoHaram, has significantly worsened the socio-political and economic situation in Nigeria. Since its formation in the early 2000s, the insurgents have been carrying out violent attacks around the country. Since 2009, when the group's founding leader Mohammed Yusuf was killed and replaced by his second-in-command, the attacks have grown significantly, became more violent and intense. Despite the poverty in northern Nigeria, where 70 per cent of people live on less than N100 a day, the Boko Haram terrorist group has at its disposal a seemingly limitless amount of heavy weaponry, vehicles, bombs and ammunition which it uses to kill with unfathomable wantonness. Boko Haram is very well-funded, with the ever-increasing cash flow.

The International Business Time Index (2014) reported that, Boko Haram worth \$25 million. This group gets money from Kidnapping, drugs, robbery, trafficking among others. Boko Haram raised fund through kidnapping; Kidnapping has become one of Boko Haram's primary funding sources. For instance, recently, Boko Haram secured \$3 million (N493,650,000) and the release of 16 prisoners in exchange for a French family of seven it seized in northern Cameroon. Also, they are suspected of carrying out dozens of other abductions-for-ransom in northern Nigeria. Apparently, most of the kidnap victims were mid-level officials, or their relatives, who were not wealthy enough to have security details, but could afford modest ransoms of about \$10,000 (N1, 645,500).

Similarly, Abducted Chibok schoolgirls, spokesman of JTF, Mr Musa, states that intelligence available to the Task Force has indicated that Boko Haram terrorists have resolved to concentrate more on kidnappings than robbery. The terrorists realized that kidnapping is more lucrative, less dangerous and requires short time to plan and execute. Similarly, a special kidnapping squad has been earmarked and tasked by the Boko Haram sect to kidnap people who could be wealthy relations, politicians, business women/ men, traditional rulers, senior civil servants and foreigners alike. Again, robbery is another means of getting money by the group. Along with ransom money, Boko Haram has partly financed its militant operations by attacking

and robbing banks. The group has robbed hundreds of banks in its home province of Borno and two other northern regions of Nigeria, mainly Yobe and Adamawa, and nabbed convoys and extorted from successful businesses. Boko Haram is widely believed to have received funding from regional and international Islamist terrorist organizations, though how much and from which groups is in dispute. The Daily Beast's Eli Lake reports that the group received some early seed money from Osama bin Laden in 2002, through a disciple named Mohammed Ali, whom bin Laden sent to Africa with \$3 million (N493, 650,000) for like-minded militant organizations. The connection between Boko Haram and al-Qaeda and its money perhaps deepened when Yusuf fled to Saudi Arabia to escape one of Nigeria's first crackdowns on the terrorist group. It remains unclear what happened while he was in Saudi Arabia, or whom he met, but Boko Haram leaders have later confirmed that big portion of their funding comes from al-Qaeda.

A Boko Haram spokesman said in 2011: "*Al-Qa'ida are our elder brothers. We enjoy financial and technical support from them. Anything we want from them we ask them.*" The US Treasury Department said in a statement to Reuters that the United States has seen evidence that Boko Haram has received financial support from Al-Qa'ida in the Islamic Magreb (AQIM), an offshoot of the jihadist group founded by Osama bin Laden. "*Any financial support AQIM might still be providing Boko Haram would pale in comparison to the resources it gets from criminal activities,*" said one U.S. official, speaking on condition of anonymity. The group has also reportedly gotten money from Somali group al-Shabab. Haile mariamDesalegn, the visiting Prime Minister of Ethiopia, said members of the radical Islamist sect, Boko Haram operating in Nigeria, as well as the al-Shabab operating in East Africa, get their funding from outside Africa (International Terrorism Index, 2014).

1.6 Impacts of Boko Haram on the Political Economy of Northeast of Nigeria

The wanton destruction of lives and property in the northeast has fast deteriorating Nigerian political economy. Today most Nigerians are facing the risk of being exterminated as a result of Boko Haram insurgency (Terrorism). The impacts of Boko Haram insurgency in contemporary Nigerian political economy have left behind inestimable damages to every facet of life in Nigeria mostly in the northern region. There is no gainsaying that, the upsurges of terrorism have slow down national economic growth and development, since no investors would invest in a crisis ridden nation like Nigeria (Baiyewu, 2012; Interview, 2016). This was reiterated in an interview that, it further compounded the problems associated with the relocation of Multinational Companies to safer territories in Africa like Ghana due to infrastructural decay. The ongoing insurgency has had a significant negative impact on the regional economy. Lebanese and Indian expatriates who have established businesses in Kano going back decades have relocated to Abuja and the south. A good number have left the country altogether. Hotels, banks and other business sectors have witnessed significant reductions in their activities. The border towns that have thrived on trade with neighbouring countries have also seen their businesses curtailed because of increasing restrictions on cross-border traffic. In Kano alone, an estimated 126 industries have recently closed down (Sunday Trust, 2012; Interview, 2016).

One of the noticeable effect has been the tendency to worsen unemployment and lead to youth restiveness, thereby making crime a profitable venture and attractive. It has also led to near collapse of tourism industry as the nation loses huge foreign currency that could have accrued from this sector (interview, 2016). Boko Haram insurgent threaten the viability of Nigerian state, bringing about economic crises, political instability and destruction. Boko Haram insurgency poses serious dangers to Nigeria's nascent democracy and economic development (Isyaku, 2013; Oviasogie, 2013; Interview, 2016). Insurgency in the region paves ways for vicious political violence in Nigeria and lack of legitimacy of government. Terrorism affects voting behaviours and access to life satisfaction (William *et al*, 2012; interview, 2016). Northeast (mostly Adamawa, Yobe and Borno) the centre of the activities of the sect have crippled economically. Thousands of people have died in the sect bloody campaign. Boko Haram insurgency led to closure of business activities within Northeast. The insurgents caused migration of people from North to Southern part of the country (Dauda, 2014; Abbas, interview 2016). The mass emigration of Nigerians citizen, who are non-indigene to northern region of the major conflict affected cities posed a serious threat to political economy of Nigeria. The rush to escaped from the north affecting the profitability of business establishment in the region (Interview, 2016).

The contradictions caused by Boko Haram insurgency in the area of social relations of production and productive forces in Nigeria's political economy are very obvious. Recent report from Economist (2014) shown that, banks have closed down their business outlets due to a decrease of economic activities in the volatile areas. The employees of these institutions are increasingly demanding that they be posed to less volatile branches. Indeed, a mass departure from the northern region will not only constitute a depletion of economy but also caused those departing from the region into financial and psychological pressure (interview, 2016).

The insurgency in the northeast affected input from agricultural sector, which constitute certain

percentage of national income in Nigerian economy. In the north, the security situations affected farmland production and that has led to some increase in food prices. The central bank of Nigeria (CBN) recently reported that, food prices rose 9.8% and inflation hit 8.2%, the highest it has been in the few months of the sect's disruption.

According to Nigeria's National Statistics Bureau (2014), the effects of conflict of being attacked by insurgent, farm workers feared attack, while grazing animals, agricultural sectors become targets to terrorists in need of supplies. Cash food and other items are stolen by terrorist group. Nigeria spends over 10 billion dollars yearly on importation of food items alone including sugar, wheat and rice (Eme, 2012).

Lamenting on this situation, a correspondent in an interview (2016) said that the danger has made other things like transportation more risky and therefore more expensive, putting pressure on the economic output. The manufacturers that seem to be worst hit by the hostility are those involved in the fast moving consumer goods (FMCG) sub-sector. They belong to the Foods, Beverages and Tobacco Sectoral group of the Manufacturers Association of Nigeria (MAN). They include not limited to manufacturers of soft drinks and carbonated water, flour, tea, coffee and other beverages, dairy products, fruit juice, biscuits and bakery products, animal feeds, sugar, vegetable and edible oil, poultry products, wines and spirits, cocoa, chocolate and sugar confectionery (Interviews, 2016).

Another group that is also badly affected by the effects of the hostility are the Chemicals and Pharmaceuticals sectoral group made up of manufacturers of paints, varnishes and allied products; manufacturers of pharmaceuticals, industrial, medical and special gases, soaps and detergents, toiletries and cosmetics, agrochemicals, basic industrial chemicals, petroleum products and so on. Members of the non-metallic mineral products sectoral group are equally badly affected and these include manufacturers of cement, glass, ceramics, asbestos, school chalks and crayon to name a few (Interviews, 2016). These companies have continued to suffer consistent decline in fortunes. Due to insecurity and other factors in Nigeria, the capacity of the manufacturing sector to absorb youths into its workforce has been hampered by the continuous decline in the sector, thereby further increasing the number of people available for criminality (Abdu, interview, 2016).

In 2009 - 2014, over 837 factories have collapsed and closed shops. About half of the remaining operating firms have been classified as "ailing", a situation that poses serious threat to the survival of the manufacturing sector in the country in the next few years (Okafor, 2011; Interview, 2016).

According to a survey carried out as part of its membership operational audit in January 2012 by the Manufacturers Association of Nigeria (MAN), the 837 figure represents the cumulative aggregate of firms that have shut down operations since 2009 across the country. The MAN survey usually covers five manufacturing enclaves into which the country is divided in terms of manufacturing activities. These include northern, southeast, southwest and south-south areas. The report of the survey showed that in 2011, a total number of 176 firms became terminally ill and collapsed in the northern area, comprising the Kano and Kaduna manufacturing axis. In the southeast area, which is comprised of Anambra, Enugu, Imo and Abia states, a total number of 178 companies closed shops during the period. While in the south-south area, which comprised of Rivers, Cross River and Akwa Ibom states, 46 companies shut down operations. Today, agricultural production is declining, as workers fear Boko Haram violence. There is reduction of people's patronage of products from the north because of the rumour that, terrorists are planning to send poisonous products from their region to other parts of Nigeria (Dauda, 2014; Interview, 2016).

The people living around Sambisa forest such as Maiduguri, Konduga, Mafa Dika, Damboa, Kalabale among others did not farm in the last farming season because the insurgency did not allow them to do so (Interview, 2016). The respondents further explained that, inability of farmers to cultivate their crops which they sell to supplement their food crops is caused by the insurgents. The situation has led the people to near starvation as they resort to eating unripe mangoes and other fruits to survive. Cash crop farmers like cotton, pepper and even vegetables have resorted to other trade like brick-laying and pushing trucks where any could be found as most of the population depend on handouts from NEMA and other government agencies to make ends meet. The level of damage caused by insurgents in the northeast through burning of farmlands, looting and setting ablaze of food stuffs and domestic animals have a great impact on the food security of the area, that if care is not taken and government does not intervene, the people of Borno will experience famine, as they did not farm in the farming season (Interview, 2016). The lingering Boko Haram crisis has seriously affected socio-economic activities in the state as traders from neighbouring countries of Chad, Niger and Cameroon Republic no longer come to the state to carry out business for fear of being attacked or kidnapped by the insurgent (Okafor, 2011).

On the impacts of growth and development, the sects have stunted development in the region due to its vicious activities. According to the former minister of finance Ngozi Iwela (2014) lamented that, the upsurge of Boko Haram affected the economy and development prospects, the economic activities have been slow down, slashing the nation's projected economic growth rate for 2014 from 7 to 6.5%. Boko Haram's

attacks have undermined public safety across the region and scarred its economy and development. Despite its enormous resources and huge potentialities, Nigeria remains grossly undeveloped due to insurgency.

In September 2012, the insurgents destroyed more than 25 masts and base stations in Maiduguri, Potiskum, Bauchi, Gombe and Kano, setting back efforts to improve telecommunications in the region (Interview, 2016). Lord interview (2016) on his own asked a rhetorical question that, how could development be possible in the region when all effort have been frustrated?

As result of the realist orientation and mindset of Nigerian security thinking, the Nigerian government perennially embarked on larger portions of states funds for security. For instance, in 2014 federal budget, the Nigerian government allocated 19.4% of the total budget for the year (The Leadership, 2012; Nwozor, 2013). According to the former Nigeria's Finance Minister, Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala, key allocation of funds in the 2013 and 2014 budgets include: Critical infrastructure (including power, works, transport, aviation, gas pipelines, and Federal Capital Territory) – N497 billion; human capital development (i.e. education and health) – N705 billion; and agriculture/water resources – N175 billion. Also over N950 billion for was allocated for national security purposes, comprised of N320 billion for the Police, N364 billion for the Armed Forces, N115 billion for the Office of the NSA, and N154 billion for the Ministry of the Interior (Adebaye, 2014). A situation where the funds allocated to security alone is almost equal to funds allocated to education, health and critical infrastructure combined in a fiscal year, as is the case with Nigeria, is detrimental to national development. The development is only meant for security forces not for the people of the northeast except the recent intervention by Buhari's government on re-structuring the northeast partner with other NGOs (Taofi interview, 2016). In essence, it gulped the Nigerian government millions of Naira to put in place numerous amenities which are destroyed during crisis. Resources, which could have been used to improve these amenities and embark on other developmental projects, would have to be used on restructuring and replacing what have been damaged during crisis. In most cases government compensated victims of these crisis and this gulped millions of naira, which could have been used for economic development (Interviews, 2016).

Since no economic development could take place in an atmosphere of fear, anarchy and insecurity becomes the order of the day. It therefore implies that Boko Haram menaces are bane to economic development. By implication however, this large amount further expand the frontiers of the militarization of the political economy and acted as a necessary folder to the blossoming of corruption (Izah, 2014). In fact, security vote money in Nigeria presently has been used by states and local governments to promote violence and co-opt political opponents or has been lost to graft and patronage (Interview, 2016).

1.7 Findings and Conclusion

Boko Haram insurgency constitutes a serious threat to development of Nigerian state; the socio-economic impacts, human cost and displacement of the people from their homes. The Boko Haram insurgency has further added to the continued political instability in Nigeria. Although this conflict is not the first of all sectarian violence, it remains the most virulent with the potential to not only destabilize the country but also the rest of the region.

Again, Boko Haram sect is not just any militia group in Nigeria pursuing its legitimate interest in the society. This is a fringe terrorist group that has virtually declared war on Nigerian state on the account demanding for cancellation of secular constitution of the state. It has killed and destroyed hundreds of innocents Nigerians through suicide bombings in several states of the federation. Boko Haram sect has sacked police stations and other security formations, catering away arms and ammunition from them. The group have assaulted prisons and freed criminals. Consequently, insecurity becomes the order of the day, where bandits had grown wings, trying to overpower the custodian of the nation's socio-economic development. This resulted to poverty and underdevelopment, weak public institutions, poor governance, and unethical leadership. Boko Haram insurgency is catastrophic and needs quick response, due to its significant effects on the health, welfare of the people and political stability on Nigerian state. Federal government should be bold enough to deal decisively with those found in connection with the Boko Haram irrespective of their highly placed in the society. The government of Nigeria should partner with the international community in addressing the Boko Haram insurgency. Insurgency is a global phenomenon; therefore, it is advisable that it should also be addressed through global collaboration. In promoting foreign investment and sustainable development in the region, federal and state governments should show more concern and interest in using their skilful and professional competence to bring about security and safety of the environment for the Nigerian and foreign investors.

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